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Woodrum and McBride: Controlled Group Liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan A

CONTROLLED GROUP LIABILITY UNDER THE
MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS
ACT: LIABILITY WITHOUT LIMIT?
JoHN R. WOODRTUM*

TIMOTHY B. McBRIDE**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980
(MPPAA)' revolutionized the rules applicable to employers who participate in multiemployer pension plans. 2 The principal change
wrought by MPPAA is the imposition of statutory withdrawal liability on any employer withdrawing in whole or in part 3 from a
plan with unfunded vested benefits. 4 Withdrawal liability exists independently of any provision in the parties' labor agreement and,
indeed, cannot be limited by the parties through collective bargainingA
* Partner, Smith, Heenan & Althen, Washington, D.C.; B.A. Harvard College, 1969; J.D.,
University of Southern California, 1974.
** Partner, Smith, Heenan & Althen, Washington, D.C.; B.A. Santa Clara University, 1967;
J.D. and L.L.M. Taxation, Georgetown University Law Center, 1975, 1980.
1. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1453 (1985 &
Supp. 1987) [hereinafter MPPAA].
2. A multiemployer plan is a plan created pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between a union and two or more participating employers. Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
§ 4001(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3) (1985 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter ERISA].
3. A complete withdrawal occurs when a participating employer ceases to have an obligation
to contribute (e.g. ceases to be signatory to a labor agreement) or permanently ceases covered operations (e.g., goes out of business). 29 U.S.C. § 1383 (1985). A partial withdrawal can occur under
several scenarios, most frequently when an employer suffers a 70 percent or greater decline in contribution base units (hours/tons) for three consecutive plan years. 29 U.S.C. § 1385 (1985).
4. A defined benefit plan has vested, unfunded liability when the assets of the plan are insufficient, on an actuarial basis, to provide the plan beneficiaries with promised pension benefits
which are then vested.
5. The amount of a plan's unfunded liability can, of course, be affected in collective bargaining
in the sense that an increase in benefit levels or per unit contribution amounts will alter the plan's
liability. However, the parties cannot limit liability owed under MPPAA through the use of language
such as that in Article XX(d)(3) of successive National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements ("[t]he
sole obligation under this Section of any Employer signatory hereto shall be to contribute the amounts
specified in this Section"). As the Court noted in Connolly v. PBGC, "[p]arties cannot remove their
transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power making contracts about them." Connolly
v. PBGC, 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1025 (1986) (citations omitted) (quoting Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935)). See also DeBreceni v. Healthco-D.G. Stoughton, 579 F.
Supp. 296 (D. Mass. 1984).
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This article will review the salient provisions of MPPAA as they

relate to coal industry employers and will examine the Act's controlled group rules 6 in depth. Although the examples will draw on

coal industry situations the controlled group rules discussed herein
apply to any employer sponsoring or participating in any defined
benefit pension plan. 7
MPPAA's impact on the coal industry has not been as broadbased as the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act' or the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act 9 because it applies only to
employers signatory to a labor agreement requiring participation in
a multiemployer pension plan such as the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA) 1950 and 1974 Pension Plans ("the UMWA

Plans"). Even within this limited group of employers, only those
who withdraw in whole or in part from the UMWA Plans will be
affected by MPPAA. Unfortunately, the consequences for those em-

ployers caught up in the Act's ambit can be devastating. For example, an employer's MPPAA liability can actually exceed the
cumulative total contributions paid to the plan, as many employers
withdrawing from the UMWA Plans have learned. 0 Even more surprising is that under MPPAA's controlled group concept, a plan

may pursue related, non-participating corporations and, in some

6. ERISA § 4001(b), 29 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1985 & Supp. 1987). In essence, the controlled
group rules provide that all corporations and unincorporated trades or businesses with at least 80
percent common ownership are treated as a single entity for purposes of assessing and collecting
MPPAA liability. Under these rules related employers will be liable for each others' pension obligations.
7. A defined benefit plan is one that specifies the benefit payable to the participant for life,
after retirement.
8. Federal Mine Safety & Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1986).
9. Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1986).
10. Withdrawal liability for an employer participating in the United Mine Workers of America
(UMWA) Pension Plans is calculated in accordance with the formula set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3)
(1985), referred to as the "rolling-five" method. The greater a plan's unfunded liability, the greater
the withdrawal liability. The unfunded liability of the UMWA Plans was so large for the plan year
ending June 30, 1981, for example, that it was not uncommon for employers withdrawing between
July 1, 1981 and June 30, 1982 to be assessed substantially more in withdrawal liability than they
contributed. This possibility is now remote because the funding status of both UMVA Plans has
improved significantly in recent years. Indeed, the 1950 Plan was fully funded as of the plan year
ending June 30, 1987. However, events such as a benefit increase or a decline in the value of a plan's
assets resulting from investment reversals can affect a plan's funding status.
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cases, individual shareholders personally for the withdrawn corporation's MPPAA liability.
This article contends that a lack of critical analysis by those
courts which have applied the controlled group rules in the multiemployer plan context has created the potential for limitless corporate and personal liability. This result is in contravention of
Congressional intent,1 is in derogation of MPPAA's principal goal
of encouraging employers to participate in multiemployer pension
plans, 12 and raises significant constitutional concerns.
II.

BACKGROUND

In 1974 Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 3 the most comprehensive federal regulation of
private pension plans ever enacted. One of ERISA's most important
features is the requirement that plan sponsors fully fund the pension
benefits promised to their employees. 4 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a federal corporation, was established to serve,
among other things, as a guarantor of pensions benefits where a
plan is unable to make the payments.'ERISA regulates both single employer and multiemployer pension plans. Prior to the enactment of MPPAA, an employer participating in a multiemployer pension plan could withdraw and pass
to those employers remaining in the plan the financial burden of

11. Although the various legislative reports leading to the enactment of ERISA discussed the
need for some degree of employer liability for terminated underfunded plans, they emphasize that
"if the degree of liability was so absolute to the extent of the employer's assets, it might drive some
employers to the brink of bankruptcy, impose substantial economic hardship, or discourage the establishment of plans or the reasonable liberalization of benefits." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4654 & S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4862.

12. "It is herely declared to be the policy of this Act. . . to alleviate certain problems which
tend to discourage maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans.
... 29 U.S.C. §
100la(c)(2) (1985 & Supp. 1987). See also, H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2918, 2919-20, 2935, 2993, 3004.

13. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
14. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1985). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC) insures benefits by assessing a premium against all plans. ERISA, § 4006, 29 U.S.C. § 1306 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
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paying off the plan's unfunded liability. 16 Congress became concerned that this was a destabilizing loophole in ERISA which actually encouraged employers to withdraw from multiemployer plans.17
To address these perceived deficiencies, in 1980, Congress enacted
the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act. The cornerstone
of the changes imposed by MPPAA is the requirement that any
participating employer which withdraws from a multiemployer plan
after September 26, 1980, must pay to the plan a pro-rata share of
any unfunded liability which existed as of the end of the preceding
plan year. 18
With respect to the assessment and collection of liability, MPPAA
is as avowedly pro-plaintiff as any statute ever enacted. Indeed, it
would be difficult to construct a collection mechanism more favorable to plaintiffs or more disadvantageous to defendants. For
example, the Act includes a statutory presumption that determinations of plan trustees are presumed to be correct unless shown
by a preponderance of the evidence to be unreasonable or clearly
erroneous. 19 Furthermore, an employer must pay the amounts as20
sessed by a plan even though the assessment is being challenged.
The statute also provided for elaborate and costly administrative
review proceedings. 2' Any misstep in invoking or pursuing these procedures constitutes an absolute waiver of an employer's right to
present virtually any defense on the merits in subsequent court proceedings. Indeed, there appears to be an alarming trend in the case
law that the courts will not even hear questions of pure statutory

16. Under the law as enacted in 1974, a withdrawn employer could be assessed liability for up
to 30% of its assets, but only if the plan terminated within five years after the employer ceased to
participate. See PBGC v. R.A. Gray Co., 467 U.S. 717, 721-22 n.2 (1984).
17. See R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. at 721-22, 730.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1985). The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. No. 98369, 98 Stat. 494, 899, (codified as amended in scattered section of 26 U.S.C.) deferred MPPAA's
effective date from April 29, 1980 to September 26, 1980. See I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Allied
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 481 (1984).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(A) (1985). This presumption is difficult to square with due process
concerns about impartial decision making in view of the fact the plan trustees are subject to statutory
fiduciary obligations charging them with the obligation to protect the interest of plan beneficiaries.
Nevertheless this presumption has been upheld by several courts. Robbins v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan
Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. 641, 672 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (citations omitted).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(d) (1985).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1399 & 1401.
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interpretation unless they were first submitted to an arbitrator.22 The
statute also provides that in any action to enforce, vacate, or modify
the arbitrator's award there shall be a presumption rebuttable only
by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the arbitrator's findings of fact are correct. 23 One commentator, concluding that these
procedures raise serious due process issues, has observed that, "[t]he
dispute resolution process prescribed by MPPAA is unprecedented
because it compels arbitration of a dispute and requires the arbitrator to defer to the findings of one party, while denying either
party the right to a trial de novo." 24
lEmployers may decline to arbitrate for many reasons. Small employers such as contract mining operators (the group most likely to
be assessed in the coal industry) typically do not pursue administrative remedies because they have virtually no understanding of
MPPAA, particularly of the controlled group rules. Furthermore,
the statute's administrative review requirements are complicated, timeconsuming, and, from the employer's perspective, have all the trappings of the proverbial kangaroo court. As a practical matter, however, this statutorily created procedural barrier is of great value to
a plan. Since an employer may be precluded from raising any defense
not presented in arbitration, no matter how meritorious, a federal
court collection action by a plan against an employer who has failed
to navigate the shoals of arbitration is tantamount to obtaining a
25
default judgment.

22. The extreme to which some courts have gone is illustrated by I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund
v. Clinton Engines Corp., 825 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In this case the district court concluded
that the plan had wrongly applied § 4204 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1384, pertaining to the sale of
assets when it issued a liability assessment against Cooper Industries. Id. at 421 n.13. On appeal, the
Court held that, although no disputed facts were in issue, questions involving only statutory interpretation must first be presented to an arbitrator. Id. at 422-23. Since the company had not complied
with ERISA's arbitration provisions, the Court reversed the trial court and ordered judgment entered
for the plan, even though the Court did not question the trial court's interpretation of § 4204. Accord
Robbins v. Chipman Trucking, 8 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1251 (1986). Contra Central Transp.
Inc. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 639 F. Supp. 788, 640 F.Supp.
56 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), affd, 816 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 290 (1987); Central
States Pension Fund v. 888 Corp., 813 F.2d 760, 764 (6th Cir. 1987).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(2) & (c) (1985).
24. Note, Trading Fairnessfor Efficiency: Constitutionality of the Dispute Resolution Procedures of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 71 GEo. L.J. 161, 189 (1982).
25. These procedural barriers are particularly burdensome to coal industry employers. Most
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The Act's requirement that a court must award a plan mandatory
attorney fees and liquidated damages26 is, perhaps, the coup de grace,

providing a plan with a weapon of enormous consequence.2 7 An
employer willing to absorb the litigation costs associated with challenging a questionable assessment will often reconsider when apprised that an adverse decision will automatically include the
additional cost of the plan's attorneys fees. Indeed, the one-sided
attorney's fees weapon is sufficiently intimidating that many employers will forgo challenging a plan's assessment, unless the amount
at stake is substantial.
Against this backdrop of adverse statutory barriers and presumptions, MPPAA does offer some ameliorative provisions. For
example, section 4210 states that a plan may provide that no liability
will be assessed against an employer who participated in the plan
for six years or less (the "free-look" rule). 28 In order to reduce the
burden on small employers section 4209(a) provides that up to $50,000
in liability will be waived (the mandatory de minimus rule), and
section 4209(b) states that a plan may provide that up to $100,000
can be forgiven under certain circumstances (the discretionary de
minimus rule). 29 Furthermore, section 4225(a) provides that where
the withdrawal is occasioned by a bona fide sale of all or substan-

companies withdrawing from the UMWA Plans are small family owned contract mining companies.
They exist on the margin and have minimal assets by the time they cease operation. They are also
the ones least likely to have access to legal counsel or others knowledgeable about the intricacies of
MPPAA. The significance of this is particularly relevant when, in a collection action, the Plan pursues
personal liability under MPPAA's controlled group rules.
26. ERISA, § 502(g)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (1985). A plan is entitled to interest, costs,
attorney's fees and liquidated damages equal to 20 percent of the delinquent withdrawal liability
payments, or double interest, whichever is greater. If the employer is unsuccessful the attorneys fees
award is mandatory irrespective of the merits of the employer's position. See also Central States
Pension Fund v. 888 Corp., 813 F.2d 760 (6th Cir. 1987)(reversing trial court's award of attorney's
fees to employer who prevailed in litigation).
27. Whereas an employer can exercise control over the costs and fees incurred by his own
counsel, he has no such control over the plan's litigation costs. Ironically, since the plans will automatically recoup their litigation costs only if they are successful, they have a positive incentive to
engage in a "scorched earth" litigation policy. A defendant may, of course, challenge a plan's attorney's fee claim as being unreasonable, but again at the risk of incurring additional attorney's fees.
The fact that an attorney's fee award is mandatory also gives a plan an incentive to be intransigent
in accommodating an employer's position in settlement discussions.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1390(a)(2)(1985).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1389(a) & (b) (1985).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/4
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tially all of the employer's assets, withdrawal liability is limited to
30% of the first $2 million of the employer's liquidation or dissolution value. 0 The Supreme Court relied on these moderating provisions in Connolly v. PBGC,31 rejecting a claim that MPPAA's
withdrawal liability provisions were violative of the Fifth Amendment. Unfortunately, section 4211 (d)(2)32 specifies that none of these
ameliorative provisions are available to employers participating in
the UMWA Plans unless the Plan is amended to provide accordingly.
The UMWA Plans have yet to adopt even one of these mitigating
rules.
III. THE CONTROLLED GROUP RuLEs: A LIABILITY NIGHTMARE
CoME TRUE

In view of MPPAA's undeniable pro-plan orientation, it is not
surprising that many employers will elect not to contest a notice of
withdrawal liability assessment. Typically, the recipient of an assessment letter has ceased to contribute because business reversals
have created a situation where further operations would only exacerbate an already poor financial condition. 33 For such employers,
a challenge to the assessment, even if successful, would be of no
material consequence to the company's future viability. Thus, the
decision to leave the corporation's remaining assets to the creditors,
34
including the multiemployer plan, may come easily.

30. 29 U.S.C. § 1405(a) (1985). This liability limitation is on a sliding scale; 30% for the first
$2 million, and an increasing percentage reaching 80% of the dissolution value in excess of $10

million.
31. Connolly v. PBGC, 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026-27, n.8. (1986).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1391(d)(2)(1985). This section refers to plans covered under § 404(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code. In fact, the UM'VWA Plans are the only § 404(c) plans in existence.
33. The assessment may be ignored for other reasons too. Frequently, contract mining companies think that any liability is tile responsibility of the lessor/licensor who actually made contri-

butions to the plans on behalf of the contractor. Also, such companies may view their cessation of
contributions as temporary because they anticipate a resumption of operations. Neither is an adequate
defense. See, e.g., Coal Drilling Serv. v. UMWA 1974 Pension Plans, 5 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 1833 (1984) (Polak, Arb.); United Food & Commercial Workers Pension v. G. Bartusch Pack-

ing Co., 546 F. Supp. 852 (D. Minn. 1982).
34. This is especially true when the assessment is against a company which leases its mining
equipment, or has used its equipment to secure bank loans to obtain operating capital. As a practical

matter, the primary asset of such companies is their work force. Since they typically have minimal
unencumbered assets, they have little incentive to contest a large assessment, even if viable defenses

exist.
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While this may appear to be a practical business judgment, it
may also be a prescription for disaster for any employer falling
within the scope of ERISA's controlled group regulations. Multiemployer plans have argued that these rules which were devised

for a completely different purpose enable them to transcend the
boundaries of limited corporate liability to reach affiliated corporations, and even the shareholders' personal assets in order to collect
the withdrawn employer's MPPAA liability.35 Regrettably, many
courts have applied these rules in a totally mechanical fashion lead-

ing to an extreme expansion of liability, unjustified in many situations because there is no rational connection between the underfunded
plan and the secondarily liable party.
A.

Scope of the Controlled Group Rules
Any analysis of MPPAA controlled group liability begins with

section 4201(a) of ERISA,16 which imposes withdrawal liability on
an "employer" who withdraws from a multiemployer plan. Moreover, section 4001(b)(1) provides in relevant part:
For purposes of this subchapter, under regulations prescribed by the [Pension
Benefit Guaranty] corporation, all employees of trades or businesses (whether or
not incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated as employed
by a single employer and all such trades and business as a single employer. The
regulations prescribed under the preceding sentence shall be consistent and coextensive with regulations prescribed for similar purposes by the Secretary of the
37
Treasury under section 414(c) of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1954].

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation has never promulgated
explanatory regulations tailored to MPPAA. 8 Instead, the inter-

35. Where the participating employer is a proprietorship or partnership, the prospect of unlimited personal liability for MPPAA assessments is consistent with well established legal doctrine.
However, application of the controlled group rules to extend liability beyond the assets of a withdrawing corporation is a substantial change insofar as it is not premised on traditional exceptions to
limited corporate liability such as piercing the corporate veil or alter ego.
36. ERISA, § 4201(a) 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (1982).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1987). Section 3(5) of Title I of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(5) (1985 & Supp. 1987) also defines an employer as: "[a]ny person acting directly as an
employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan; and
includes a group or association of employers acting for an employer in such capacity." Most courts
have declined to apply this definition to Title IV withdrawal obligations. See Connors v. P&M Coal
Co.. 801 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/4
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pretation of when a group of trades or businesses shall be treated
as a single employer has been left to the courts, which must rely
on section 414(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)3 9 and the
regulations issued thereunder.4 0 The rules are quite extensive and a
complete analysis is beyond the scope of this article.41 In essence
they have been interpreted to mean that an individual or entity may
be held jointly and severally liable for a related company's withdrawal obligation, no matter how independent or remote their commercial relationship.
Code section 1563(a)42 and its implementing regulations 43 recognize three types of controlled groups: parent-subsidiary," brotheror not incorporated) which are under common control' has the same meaning as in section 414(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954." The PBGC's failure to develop implementing rules which
reflect the specific goals and issues relating to withdrawal from a multiemployer plan lies at the very
heart of the liability crisis employers now face.
39. 26 U.S.C. § 414(c) (1978) provides: "Employees of Partnership,Proprietorships,etc., Which
Are Under Common Control.-Forpurposes of sections 401, 408(k), 410, 411, 415, and 416, under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, all employees of trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated as employed by a single employer. The
regulations prescribed under this subsection shall be based on principles similar to the principles which
apply in the case of subsection (b)."
40. 26 C.F.R. §§ 11.414(c)-i to -5 (1987).
41. See generally Hessenthaler & Sharp, The Existence and Implications of a Controlled Group
of Corporations Under ERISA, 10 J. PEN. PLAN. & COMPL. 111 (1984) for a discussion of the controlled group rules. The substantive rules for determining when a group of incorporated or unincorporated trades or businesses are members of a controlled group are located in 26 U.S.C. § 1563
(1982 & Supp. 1987). It should be noted that although § 1563 defines "controlled group of corporations" for purposes of limiting certain multiple tax benefits for controlled corporations, courts have
not hesitated to use this section as the basis for assigning MPPAA withdrawal liability to other types
of entities.
42. 26 U.S.C. § 1563(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The relevance of § 1563(a) to MPPAA liability
determinations occurs through a circuitous route. Section 4001(b) of ERISA references § 414(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code [pertaining to partnerships and proprietorships under common control]
which refers to regulations based on principles similar to regulations under § 414(b) [pertaining to
controlled groups of corporations] which in turn cross-references § 1563(a) [which defines controlled
groups]. This cumbersome linkage has generated significant controversy. See Note, Termination Liability Under Title IV of ERISA: Impact on Companies Under Common Control, 27 CAsE W. REs.
L. REv. 945 (1977). See also PBGC v. Ouimet Corp. 630 F.2d 4, 13 (st Cir. 1980) (Bownes, J.,
concurring).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1 to -3 (1987).
44. 26 U.S.C. § 1563(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Parent-subsidiary controlled groups generally
encompass all corporations in one or more chains which are connected via a common parent corporation, and where an 80% stock ownership test is met. For example, L Corp. owns 80% of the
only class of stock of M Corp. M Corp. owns 40% of the only class of stock of 0 Corp. L Corp.
also owns 80% of the only class of stock of N Corp., which, in turn, owns 40% of the only class
of stock of 0 Corp. Result: L Corp. is the common parent of a parent-subsidiary controlled group
Disseminated
bymember
The Research
Repository
WVU,
0. 1988
Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(2)(ii) (Example (3)).
L, M, N,@and
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sister, and a combination of the two. 45 Under these tests, it is immaterial whether the stock of the member corporation is closely held,
or publicly traded. 46 Consequently, if one member of a controlled

group of corporations withdraws from a multiemployer pension plan,
all members, as determined under Code section 1563, may be jointly
and severally liable for the amount of the withdrawal obligation. 47
These rules, especially the brother-sister controlled group test,
have swept many unsuspecting coal industry employers into the controlled group nightmare. A brother-sister controlled group exists

where the same five or fewer individuals own at least 80% of two
or more corporations and, when taking into account the lowest common ownership percentage for each individual in the companies,
such individuals own more than 50% of the total stock of all companies. 48 This principle is illustrated by the following example in

which L, M and N are members of a brother-sister controlled group: 49

45. 26 U.S.C. § 1563(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1987). This is a catch-all which encompasses any
group which contains both a chain of corporations and brother-sister corporations.
46. See T.L. Hunt. Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977)(closely held corporations).
47. See generally PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 470 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mass. 1979). aff'd, 630 F.2d
4 (lst Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 (1981).
48. Section 1563(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1987) defines a "brother-sister controlled group" as
[t]wo or more corporations if 5 or fewer persons who are individuals, estates, or trusts
own (within the meaning of subsection (d)(2)) stock possessing(A) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entItled
to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of the stock of each
corporation, and
(3) more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled
to vote or more than 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of each
corporation, taking into account the stock ownership of each such person only to the extent
such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such corporation.
49. Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 4927.20 (1986). This example reflects the holding in United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer Company, 455 U.S. 16 (1982), invalidating Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) which
permitted inclusion of stock held by individuals not owning stock in each corporation in the group.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/4
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B
C
26
45
40
45
30
1
96
91
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Identical
Percentage
Stock
Ownership
26
25
1
52

For a more realistic example, consider Bad Luck Coal Corporation, owned 50% each by two individuals, Mr. Inby and Mr. Outby.
Inby and Outby are also equal partners in the Good Luck Partnership, which owns a Dairy Queen franchise in Hawaii. Under the
brother-sister controlled group rules, Bad Luck and Good Luck are
treated as a single employer.
To tighten the controlled group net, the rules provide for attribution of ownership.- Thus, to determine a person's ownership
percentage, stock will be deemed constructively owned by that person in certain situation. Stock ownership may be attributed to a
person from partnerships, estates or trusts, corporations, spouses,
and minor children. Application of these attribution rules could result in pulling an unwary spouse, who is part owner simply due to
tax reasons, into the controlled group, thus making his or her assets
available for the satisfaction of withdrawal liability. Moreover, if
any person, including a corporation, has an option to acquire stock
of a corporation, such stock will be considered owned by the option
holder.52
The implications of these rules for expanding the universe of
those liable for the withdrawal obligations of a corporation are extraordinary. Literal application of the rules would make an individual, such as a farmer, engineer, grocer, consultant or other person

50. The remaining stock in L, M and N is owned by unrelated third parties.
51. 26 U.S.C. § 1563(e)(2)-(6) (1982 & Supp. 1987). 26 C.F.R. §§ 11.414(c)-4(b)(4),(5),(6)(1987).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 1563(e)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987); 26 C.F.R. § 11.414(c)-4(b)(1987). An option
to acquire an option will also be considered an option to purchase stock. See IUE Pension Fund v.
Barker & Williamson Co., 788 F.2d 118 (3rd Cir. 1986) for a vivid example of how the mere ownership
of a stock option may create liability that would not otherwise exist.
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conducting an unincorporated trade or business (even part-time) per-

sonally liable for all withdrawal liability53 assessed by a plan against
a separate corporation which is at least 80% owned by the indi-

vidual. For example, consider the case of Larry Litigator, a solo
practitioner, who also is the sole shareholder of Bad Luck Coal
Company, a corporation which contributes to the UMWA Plans.
Assume Mr. Litigator purchased Bad Luck for $300,000 and has
never taken any salary or dividends during the time he has owned
the company. For reasons beyond anyone's control, Bad Luck goes

out of business, and Mr. Litigator loses his entire investment. To
compound Bad Luck's woes, the UMWA Plans issue Bad Luck a

withdrawal liability assessment totaling $300,000. Under the controlled group rules, Mr. Litigator may be personally liable for Bad
Luck's $300,000 withdrawal assessment, despite the fact that his only
connection to the company is the loss of his $300,000 investment.
The foregoing example may appear extreme and unrealistic. Unfortunately, it is commonplace. 54 It is not at all unusual for one or
more individuals to incorporate a company which participates in a
multiemployer plan and, at the same time, engage in other investment or commercial activity through an unincorporated entity.$' Ultimately, this may result in the individuals being held personally
53. ERISA, § 4225(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1405(c) (1985), limits the liability of an individual obligated
to contribute to a plan as a proprietor or partner to assets not subject to protection under bankruptcy
law. See also Teamsters' Pension Trust Fund v. H. F. Johnson, 830 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1987).
54. See, e.g., Connors v. Eskimo Coal Co., No. 85-3430 (D.D.C. June 26, 1986)(two 50%
shareholders sued personally under § 4001(b) because they also had an equipment leasing partnership,
even though the partnership did not conduct any business with the withdrawn employer); Connors
v. Black Bolt Coal Co., No. 86-2749 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1987) (sole shareholder of withdrawn corporation
also owned a music store and other unincorporated non-coal business interests); Connors v. B&M
Coal Co. No. 84-514 (D.D.C. May 28, 1986)(shareholder sued personally because he had a leasing
company which owned a parcel of land on which was located a fast food franchise); Connors v.
Longwall Mining, No. 86-2478 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 1987)(two 50% shareholders sued personally because
they also had a partnership which invested primarily in oil and gas leases); Connors v. Calvert Dev.
Co.. 622 F. Supp. 877 (D.D.C. 1985)(no discussion concerning business engaged in by the partnership):
Connors v. Peles Coal Co., 637 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1986)(no discussion concerning business engaged
in by proprietorship); Connors v. Incoa, Inc., No. 86-3162 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 1986) (See order of
July 8, 1987, permitting filing of amended complaint against shareholders on the basis of their unincorporated ownership of farm).
55. For tax reasons, conducting investment or business activity in this manner may be desirable,
especially where the unincorporated entity has no employees and does not intend to do business with
the general public.
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liable for the corporation's withdrawal liability. This application of
the controlled group rules shocks the conscience and undermines
MPPAA's stated goal of encouraging new employers to join multiemployer plans. Furthermore, in the multiemployer context, it cannot be harmonized with the underlying purpose of the controlled
group concept, as discussed below.
B.

Purpose of the Controlled Group Rules

The controlled group concept is quintessentially a device to insure
fairness and uniformity in the implementation and administration
of employee benefit plans and the nation's tax laws. Indeed, the
controlled group concept actually pre-dates ERISA, and was first
utilized, in the form adopted by ERISA, to address abuses in the
56
use of multiple corporate surtax exemptions by related employers.
ERISA does not require an employer to offer pension plan coverage. However, it does set forth detailed substantive and procedural
requirements which a plan, if made available, must satisfy. When
ERISA was enacted in 1974, Congress was concerned that a sponsoring employer could split a business into smaller parts and provide
a tax-qualified pension plan to only those parts of the enterprise in
which the owners, officers or more highly paid employees were employed in violation of the Act's nondiscriminatory coverage and benefit rules.57 The controlled group concept provides the perfect antidote
to this potential abuse because it requires that all employees of commonly controlled businesses be treated as if employed by one employer.
Consider a simple example. Assume a corporation with 100 employees splits into two companies with 50 employees each. Under

56. Section 235 of the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19, added Code
sections 1561-1563 effective in 1964, limiting opportunities for companies to realize tax saving by
merely splitting into multiple corporations. See H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1426.
57. See S. REP. No. 383, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 43 reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4890, 4928. See also H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 50. reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4670, 4716. It is significant that in the legislative history using the controlled
group concept as a device to extend liability is mentioned only in passing. See H.R. REP. No. 1280,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5155.
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section 410(b)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code"8 a plan sponsored
by only one company would not qualify for favorable tax treatment
(i.e. contributions would not be deductible based on the applicable
percentage test) because the plan does not cover 70% of the 100
individuals employed by all trades or business under common control. However, even in the context of preventing discrimination in
plan coverage, Congress acknowledged that if the abuse intended to
be regulated was not present (i.e., if in fact there is no discrimination
in favor of the owners, officers or the highly compensated), separate
pension arrangements for different trades or business with the controlled group should nonetheless qualify, despite the failure to meet
the group-wide percentage coverage test. Thus, in the example above,
under the so-called nondiscriminatory classification test of Section
410(b)(1)(B),5 9 the plan would qualify if the 50 covered employees

represent a "fair cross section" of the total employment of the
"employer" (the controlled group). 60
This two-part analysis makes sense. A multi-faceted group of
companies often contains entities totally independent of one another
in their product, services or geographic location. ERISA acknowledges that where one individual unit (or subsidiary) establishes its
own retirement plan, the controlled group rules will not operate to
disqualify the plan or deny it preferential tax treatment where the
group of highly compensated employees is not receiving a disproportionate share of benefits.
The legislative history of the controlled group rules focused almost exclusively on their importance in preventing discrimination in
the establishment of plan coverage and benefits. 6 1 Under section
4001(b) of ERISA, however, the rules also operate to assign liability
to all members of a group where an underfunded single-employer

58. 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(1)(A) (1978 & Supp. 1987).

59. 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(1)(B) (1978 & Supp. 1987).
60. These tests are discussed, for example, in Sutherland v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 395 (1982)
nonacq. 1986-1 C.B. 1. The controlled group rules also apply in determining whether several other
tax-favored programs are offered on a nondiscriminatory basis. See 26 U.S.C. § 414(b) (1978 & Supp.
1987).
61. See supra note 57.
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plan is terminated or where an employer withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer plan.
The application of the controlled group rules to expand liability
for underfunded terminating pension plans similarly was grounded
in an attempt to prevent an abuse. Congress was concerned that an
employer could intentionally promise greater pension benefits than
it could afford, with knowledge that an insurance system, through
PBGC, would secure its obligations. 62 Thus, as ERISA was originally
enacted, an employer was liable to cover benefits to the extent of
300 of its net worth.6 3 The expansion of the concept of "employer"
to include members of a controlled group was arguably an extension
of this policy. 64
Unfortunately, with respect to the relevance of the rules to the
collection function, the Act does not set forth a rule of reason parallel to the nondiscriminatory classification test of Code section
410(b)(1)(B), or even the general discrimination in fact test of section
401(a)(4) of the Code. There is no statutory fairness component that
restricts the controlled group concept to situations where an employer has actually avoided responsibility for an underfunded plan
by fragmentation of a business. As a result, in the collection area
the controlled group rules are asymmetrical and are not necessarily
applied in a manner consonant with the purpose of preventing a
targeted abuse. Rather, there has been a tendency to automatically
assign liability to each of the constituent trades and businesses, even
though this might cause rather than prevent an abuse.65 This is an
unfortunate consequence of using one set of rules for two quite
disparate purposes.
This problem was noted in PBGC v. Anthony Company.6 6 In
Anthony the PBGC sought to hold a parent corporation (Kaplan)
62. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4890, 4971.
63. Section 4062 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982 & Supp. 1987), as originally enacted, was
amended by the Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100

Stat. 237, to provide for liability greater than 30%o in certain circumstances.
64. See PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d, 1085, 1092 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961

(1983).
65. See, e.g., H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d 1009; United Food & Commercial Workers Union v.
Progressive Supermarkets, 644 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1986).
66. PBGC v. Anthony Co., 542 F. Supp. 43 (N.D.III. 1982).
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liable for the unfunded liability of a bankrupt subsidiary (Anthony),
even though the economic benefit realized by Kaplan through its
affiliation with the subsidiary was substantially less than the plan's
unfunded liability. The court observed:
Indeed, in terms of the statute we are confronted with two provisions whose

principal focus was not exactly the same, but that are capable of interacting in
a totally arbitrary and unreasonable manner because of the flawed Regulations.
Anyone who has practiced in the ERISA field knows that the definition of "employer" in Section 1301(b)(1) was expressed in broad form primarily to prevent
the then-familiar practice of discriminating in pension plan coverage by creating
separate corporate entities-or put differently, to preclude companies from the
selective assignment of employees to different corporations, though the employees

were within the same economic entity in real-world terms, in an effort to avoid
the requirement that highly-paid employees not be favored by such plans. But

the termination provision aims primarily at a somewhat different problem: as
stated more extensively in the opinion, to prevent premature termination of a
plan by an employee's reasonable expectations as to pension benefits.67

IV.

A.

SINGLE EMPLOYER PLANS AND MULTIBMPLOYER PLANS:
DISTINCTIONS WITH A DFFERENCE

Single-Employer Plans

The case law interpreting ERISA's provision that "trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated . . . as a single employer" has been analyzed

and applied primarily in the context of single-employer pension plans.
Single-employer plan coverage may apply to all employees, to management employees, or only to hourly employees whether unionized
or non-unionized. 68 By definition, management has total responsibility for establishing and funding a single-employer plan. Even where
the plan results from collective bargaining with a union, the sponsoring employer is necessarily involved in every aspect of plan design
and funding, and unfunded liability attributable to benefit increases
can arise only with the consent of the employer. Furthermore, the
67. Id. at 45. (emphasis in original).
68. Assuming, of course, that the plan meets the non-discrimination tests of sections 401 and
410 of the Internal Revenue Code.
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plan exists to provide benefits exclusively for the employer's employees.
It was Congress' expressed intent that the ERISA-imposed requirement to fully fund promised pension benefits not crush the
employer. 69 Thus, ERISA provides that where the PBGC must step
in to provide the vested benefits, the Corporation's indemnification
from the employer is limited to 30% of the employer's (i.e. con70
trolled group's) net assets.
The seminal case applying the controlled group rules to assign
liability for an underfunded single-employer plan is Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet Corp.71 The facts in Ouimet Corp. are
paradigmatic of the relationship between a corporation sponsoring
an underfunded single-employer pension plan and the other trades
and businesses in the controlled group.
Ouimet Corp. involved a family of corporations (plus an unincorporated entity known as the Wareham Trust) owned by Mr.
Emil Ouimet. 72 One of the companies, Ouimet Corporation, purchased Avon Sole Company in 1968, at a time when Avon's collectively bargained plan covering its union-represented employees
was underfunded by $92,000. 73 Seven years later, when Avon filed
a Chapter XI bankruptcy petition, the plan's unfunded liability had
increased to more than $550,000. 74 After reviewing the controlled
group regulations, the court found that the Ouimet Group was clearly
under common control for purposes of section 1301(b). The court
concluded that:
We are not persuaded that, because only one of a group of corporations under
common control contributes to a plan, it is unjust to make the group responsible

69. See supra note 11.
70. Section 4062, 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982 & Supp. 1987), was amended by the Single-Employer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 237, to provide for greater
liability in certain situations.
71. PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 470 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mass. 1979). aff'd, 630 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 (1981), on appeal after remand, 711 F.2d 1085 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
72. Ouimet Corp., 630 F.2d at 6-7.
73. Id. at 7
74. Id. at 8.
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for the plan's deficit. The facts of this case illustrate why such a group should
be treated as an integrated whole. Ouimet purchased Avon with full knowledge
of the plan and its funding requirements. Ouimet participated in the labor negotiations resulting in greater pension benefits that contributed to the deficit. The
Ouimet Group filed a consolidated tax return on which the Avon contributions
were deducted. We see nothing unfair in treating the Ouimet Group as a single
employer.7

Extending liability for an underfunded pension plan beyond the
sponsoring corporation certainly constitutes a frontal assault on fundamental notions of limited liability for corporate obligations. 76 Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality
of controlled group liability, decisions in other cases suggest that
the court would not find the rules to be per se violative of the
protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment, particularly when balanced against the competing interest that employees have in their
pensions .77

It is not unreasonable to balance the equities in favor of employees who stand to lose long-held expectations of retirement income, when the actions which led to a plan's underfunding can fairly
be imputed to others who participated directly or indirectly in the
decisions leading to the underfunding, or who attained direct financial benefits by virtue of their association with the sponsoring
employer. As the trial court noted in Ouimet Corp., "[o]ne purpose
of ERISA is . . .preventing employers from promising more than
they can deliver by way of benefits when negotiating collective bargaining agreements. . . . The statute reflects Congress' judgment
that, without controlled group liability, businesses could juggle their
activities to eviscerate the termination liability provisions of ERISA." 78 Not only was Avon's funding deficiency not remedied dur-

75. Id. at 12.

76. On appeal after remand, the Ouimet court noted that the "corporate form is a creature
of state law and states may impose stringent limitations on attempts to disregard it. . . . [Hiowever,
[such limitations] do not constrict a federal statute regulating commerce for the purpose of effecting
social policies." 711 F.2d at 1093. See also Note, Extending ERISA Liability for Pension Plan Terminations to Controlled Group Members: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Quimet Corp., 61 B.U.L.
REv. 477, 501 (1981) for additional justifications for the court's conclusion that liability was properly
applied to all controlled group members.
77. See Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); See also Connolly, 106 S.
Ct. 1018.
78. Ouimet Corp., 470 F. Supp. at 955.
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ing the time Mr. Ouimet controlled the company, it worsened
substantially. In this regard, it cannot be gainsaid that Mr. Ouimet
either knew or should have known that Avon's acquiescence in labor
negotiations to benefit increases without a commensurate funding
commitment might leave Avon employees without their promised
pensions.
Such considerations may provide a rational basis for application
of the controlled group rules in many single-employer plan situations. However, some factual patterns have tested the willingness of
the courts to apply the rules mechanically. In PBGC v. Anthony
Co.,79 Anthony filed a Chapter XI bankruptcy petition in February
1978 at a time its pension plan was underfunded by approximately
$1.4 million.80 The court observed that under the controlled group
rules, Anthony and Kaplan were a single employer, 81 but the court
questioned the constitutionality of the rules as applied to Kaplan.
Kaplan had acquired a majority interest in Anthony prior to the
effective date of ERISA, but after Anthony had already established
its pension plan. The court noted that in this situation,
[s]o long as the subsidiary remains a 'closed container' in economic terms, the
parent has derived no direct economic benefit from pension plan underfunding
and of course it never promised the pension benefits. In such a situation there
is no rational line between the congressional end of insuring the pension benefits
and the means of assessing the acquiring parent corporation to pay those benefits.B2

The court concluded that since Anthony had been acquired preERISA, to apply the control group rules rationally, in due process
terms, Kaplan could be held liable for Anthony's unfunded pension
obligations only to the extent that Kaplan had realized direct financial benefits through its association with its subsidiary. 3
PBGC v. Dickens 4 illustrates another factual situation in which
the court declined to apply the rules literally. In Dickens, a former
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

PBGC v. Anthony Co., 537 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1056.
PBGC v. Dickens, 535 F. Supp. 922 (W.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 719 F.2d 146 (6th Cir.
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employee of Puffer-Hubbard Products, Inc. purchased the stock of
the parent company for $1 and then laid off all of Puffer-Hubbard's
employees a few days later and filed a Chapter XI bankruptcy petition. 5 A second corporation, Heinicke Instruments Company, subsequently purchased the stock of Puffer-Hubbard's parent from Mr.
Dickens for $1.86 Ten days later, the bankruptcy court approved a
sale of Puffer-Hubbard's assets to a company unrelated to Heinicke.87 Nevertheless, the PBGC sought to hold Heinicke liable for
Puffer-Hubbard's unfunded pension liability on the theory that the
two companies were trades or businesses under common control at
the time Puffer-Hubbard's plan was terminated. 8 The court concluded that the legislative purpose for imposing liability under the
rules would not be served by including Heinicke in the controlled
group since Puffer-Hubbard was at all times under the control of
the bankruptcy court, and Heinicke was never in a position to abuse
the termination insurance program.8 9 Anthony and Dickens demonstrate that, even in the single-employer plan context, courts have
on occasion refused to apply the controlled group rules mechanically. 90
B.

Multiemployer Plans

No case applying the controlled group rules in the multiemployer
plan context has ever carefully compared the distinct differences
between the two types of plans. 9' Rather, the cases have relied on
Ouimet Corp. and its progeny and on a statement by Senator Harrison Williams in MPPAA's legislative history affirming that MPPAA
"does not modify the definition of 'employer' in any way, and the

85. Id. at 923.
86. Id. at 924.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 926.
89. Id. at 927-28. Accord Central Transp., Inc. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund. 639 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 816 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 290 (1987).
90. See also Sutherland v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 395 (1982). But compare PBGC v. Center
City Motors, 609 F. Supp. 409 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
91. See, e.g., ProgressiveSupermarkets, 644 F. Supp. 633; H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d 1009. But
see Justice O'Connor's observations in Connolly, 106 S. Ct. at 1030-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See also infra text accompanying notes 115-118.
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Ouimet Corp. decision remains good law." 92 It is true, no doubt,
that some of the reasons relied on by the courts to find a fair and
rational basis for imposing controlled group liability in the singleemployer plan context are equally applicable to many multiemployer
plans. However, many are not. The UMWA Plans provide an excellent example of the crucial differences between the two types of
plans.
Since 1950, unionized employers in the bituminous coal industry
have been covered by a uniform labor agreement known as the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. (NBCWA). 93 Bargaining
is accomplished on an industry-wide basis between the UMWA and
the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association (BCOA).94 Although
BCOA member companies have always accounted for the majority
of UMWA-represented production, association members account for
only a small fraction of those companies which are signatory to the
NBCWA. For example, of the 2,000 or so employers signatory to
the 1981 NBCWA only 130 were BCOA members.9 5 BCOA membership had declined to 52 companies by 1984.96
Non-BCOA member companies have never had any role in negotiating the National Agreement.Y Rather, after national bargaining is complete, these independent producers
traditionally were expected and, if necessary, compelled to follow the pattern set
by the UMWA National Agreement to the point of becoming 'non-member signatories' to that agreement ....

[T]he basic system of contractual relations, in

which nonmember, unionized producers were expected to sign the union's master
work contract after it was reached with the BCOA remained largely intact under
the watchful eye and powerful protection of the union. 93

92. 126 CoNo. REc. 23,287 (Aug. 26, 1980). Note that this comment probably refers to the

district court decision, as the First Circuit did not enter its decision until August 29, 1980. This is
the extent to which MPPAA's legislative history dealt with the relationship of the controlled group
rules to extending liability beyond the withdrawing corporation.
93. C. PERRY, CoI.EcTVE BARGAINING AND =-a DEcuNE oF THm UN TE MmE WoRKERs 57,
78 (University of Pennsylvania Industrial Research Unit No. 60, 1984).
94. Id. at 57, 61, 78, 113, 163.
95. Id.at 113, 245.
96. See National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (NBCWA) of 1984, at 222-23.
97. C. PERRY, supra note 93, at 161-63.
98. Id. at 162. See also id. at 57, 148, 165.
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The primary reason the UMWA has been able to impose a national
agreement (and an industry-wide pension plan) on the entire coal
industry for more than 35 years is its well-documented willingness
to resort to force. 99 Historically, if the UMWA and the BCOA fail
to reach agreement, all coal mines are shut down. 100 Rarely has a
contract strike been nonviolent, and virtually no union operator
would consider attempting to operate during a strike.101
The coal industry multiemployer pension plans evolved against

this backdrop. The UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund was created in negotiations between the UMWA and the U.S. Department

of Interior in 1946. 1 2 It was continued as a result of UMWA-BCOA
bargaining in 1950 and was continued in every NBCWA through
1974. It is the direct predecessor of the UMWA 1950 and 1974

Pension Plans which were established in 1974 collective bargaining.0 3
From 1950 through 1974 Plan Trustees made virtually all decisions including eligibility determinations and benefit levels.' t 4 If
plan assets were inadequate to maintain benefit levels set by the
Trustees, eligibility standards were changed or benefits were cut. In

response to the enactment of ERISA, national bargaining in 1974
resulted in two major changes. 05 The first involved splitting the ex99. A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, UNION VIOLENCE: Tm RECORD AND THE RESPONSE By COURTS,
LEQISLATuRES, AND THE NLRB 79-116 (University of Pennsylvania Industrial Research Unit No. 25,
1983).
100. C. PERRY, supra note 93, at 57, 62, 148. A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, supra note 99, at
40. The 1984 National Agreement was reached without a national strike. However, strike action against
independent employers who resisted Union demands continued to be characterized by extreme violence.
See, e.g., Joint UMWA/NLRB Settlement Agreement approved by National Labor Relations Board
on March 4, 1987, settling multiple violence cases and prohibiting UMWA violence against any coal
industry employers in West Virginia, Kentucky and Pennsylvania. International Union, UMWA v.
NLRB, No. 9-CB-6146-1 (Dec. 24, 1986), effectuated in, NLRB v. UMWA, District 17, No. 80-1680
& 82-1998 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 1987).
101. A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, supra note 99, at 79. See also id. at 40, 90, 95-97. As one
commentator has noted, "the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) still relies on bloodshed,
dynamite, and intimidation to coerce acceptance of the Union's demands. Not only has violence
continued to be characteristic of UMWA strikes and organizing efforts, its use has acquired the sanctity
of tradition." Id. at 79.
102. C. PERRY, supra note 93, at 138. This was the forerunner of all multiemployer pension
plans.
103. Id. at 77. See also NBCWA of 1984, art. XX(a).
104. See UMWA Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 565 n.2 (1982).
105. C. PERRY, supra note 93, at 124, 245. See also Robinson, 455 U.S. at 566.
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isting Welfare and Retirement Fund into separate plans; 10 6 the 1950
Pension Plan (participation limited to miners who last worked for
a signatory employer on or before December 31, 1975) and the 1974
Plan (participation limited to eligible miners who work(ed) for a
signatory employer on or after January 1, 1976). Secondly, benefit
levels were for the first time set by the bargainers, not the Trustees.
This, in conjunction with ERISA, converted a defined contribution
plan into two separate defined benefit plans. As noted above, all
matters relating to the Plans are within the sole province of the
UMWA and the BCOA. At no time have independent signatories
had any voice in the creation, implementation or administration of
the UMWA Pension Plans.
The situation that existed in the coal industry on the eve of the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act in 1980 can be summarized as follows. Through a series of collective bargaining agreements the UMWA and the BCOA had agreed to a level of pension
benefits that resulted in pension plan underfunding of approximately
07
$1.7 billion for the 1950 Plan and $1.8 billion for the 1974 Plan.1
Through its policy of imposing the national agreement on all companies, the Union insured that all non-BCOA companies also participated in the UMWA Plans, resorting to violence as necessary to
accomplish this end.108
C. Distinctions With a Difference
Even if the rules work reasonably well in the single-employer
plan context, they do not in multiemployer plan arena. Indeed, they
106. Two multiemployer health benefit plans were also created at this time. See NBCWA of
1974, art. XX.
107. UMWA Health and Retirement Plans Annual Report 6, 8, 10, 13 (1980). See Calvert &
Youngblood Coal Co. v. UMW 1950 & 1974 Pension Plans, 5 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2361,
2363 (1984) (Polak, Arb.).
108. Reference is made to the methods employed by the Union to maintain a uniform national
contract only to demonstrate that participation in a multiemployer plan may arise from motivations
substantially different from the voluntary sponsorship of a single-employer plan. The Union's ability
to impose the national agreement on all employers was so complete that even employers who first
became signatory after 1975 (and who therefore could never employ anyone eligible to participate in
the 1950 Plan) were nevertheless obligated to contribute to the 1950 Plan on the same basis as those
signatories who had employed eligible miners. This is particularly remarkable because, under applicable
labor law, it is an unfair labor practice for a union to insist to impasse on proposals relating to
benefits for persons already retired. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
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lead to irrational and abusive results with such frequency that the
basis for their imposition must be reexamined.
In single-employer plans, a nexus between the unfunded benefits
promised by one member of a group of trades or businesses under
common control and the other members is frequently direct and
identifiable. 10 9 The sponsoring business benefits from the services
rendered on its behalf by the covered employees. Moreover, the
company's shareholders also benefit insofar as the company has not
set aside money to pay the promised pensions. Thus, the individuals
who made or at least consented to the decisions resulting in the
underfunding also benefit from their concurrent ownership of other
businesses. The benefit is direct insofar as the companies file consolidated tax returns, do business with one another, or serve as collateral for loans. When the underfunded plan of a member company
is terminated, the PBGC must step in and underwrite the deficiency
using insurance premiums paid by all plan sponsors. In this context,
it is not unreasonable to require that other businesses in the traditional "corporate family" reimburse the PBGC for 30% of their
assets. In effect, the rules operate as a limited piercing of the sponsoring employer's corporate veil. This is consistent with the Congressional goal of shoring up the nation's pension system without
crushing any individual employer.
However, this situation contrasts sharply with that which characterizes many multiemployer plans, particularly those in the coal
industry. In the coal industry, the notion that each employer was
a willing and equal partner in the collective bargaining that created
the liability is pure fiction. Furthermore, with respect to any company which became a participant in either UMWA Plan after 1975,

109. See Connolly, 106 S. Ct. at 1030 (O'Connor, J., concurring):
Where a single employer has unilaterally adopted and maintained a pension plan for its
employees, the employer's responsibility for the presence of a promise to pay defined benefits
is direct and substantial. The employer can nominate all the plan's trustees and enjoys wide
discretion in designing the plan and determining the level of benefits. Where such a plan
holds out to employees a promise of definite benefits, and where employees have rendered
the years of service required for benefits to accrue and vest, it seems entirely rational to
hold the employer liable for any shortfall in the plan's assets, even if the plan's provisions
purport to limit the employer's liability in the event of underfunding upon plan termination.
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most if not all of the unfunded liability was already fixed." 0
Most of the other criteria offered as justification for extending
liability beyond the sponsoring employer for a single-employer plan
are equally suspect in the multiemployer plan context. Unlike a single-employer plan, a multiemployer plan does not actually terminate
when a participating employer withdraws. Thus, payments by a withdrawn employer are made to the plan, not the PBGC, and operate
to reduce the future contribution obligations of other employers, or
to fund future benefit increases. Furthermore, the employer's withdrawal liability may bear no relationship to accrued benefits attributable to its own employees. In the case of the UMWA Plans, for
example, most of the liability assessed against any withdrawing employer is attributable to benefits accrued by beneficiaries for time
worked for companies which went out of business before ERISA
was enacted. In many cases the credited time was worked for companies which were never even signatory to a UMWA labor agreement."' Indeed, with respect to any employer who first participated
in either Plan after 1974, not one dollar of withdrawal liability is
allocable to unfunded vested benefits assignable to the employer's
employees." 2 Moreover, in the single-employer plan total controlled
group liability to the PBGC is generally limited to 3007o of the group's
net worth even though the employees' services benefited only the
sponsoring employer. In the multiemployer plan, each controlled
group member is liable for 10000 of its assets even though none of

110. The 1978, 1981 and 1984 NBCVA's did provide for a benefit increase for pensioners in

both plans. Such increases would create some unfunded liability. However, in view of the sizeable
tonnage and hourly rates paid by employers under these contracts, such increase probably did not
add significantly to the Plans' net unfunded liability.
Ill. Both the 1950 and 1974 Plan and Trust documents recognize credited service for substantial

amounts of time for which no contributions were made to the Plans. Additionally, a series of court
decisions have required the Trustees to credit many miners for service which was not with a UMWA
signatory, or for which no contributions were made. See, e.g., Roark v. Boyle, 439 F.2d 497 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Pete v. UMWA Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc); Blankenship
v. UMWA Fund of 1950, Nos. 2186-69 & 2350-69 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1973)(order approving settlement).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (1985) required that underfunded plans become fully funded within
a specified period of years. Thus, since 1974 an employer's tonnage and hourly contributions to the
UMWA Plans have been sufficient to fund the benefits being earned by active employees, plus pay
off the unfunded liability which was created in 1974 when the Plans were converted from defined
contribution to defined benefit plans.
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the unfunded benefits may be attributable to beneficiaries who
worked for the employer.
In view of such considerations, the justification for imposing
liability for unfunded benefits which existed before a withdrawing
employer even joined the plan is subject to severe criticism."' Such
liability is particularly objectionable where it exceeds the employer's
net worth. Expanding the universe of those responsible for paying
this liability to include affiliated trades and businesses clearly injects
a constitutional dimension, particularly where the affiliated entity
has had no connection to the withdrawn employer other than common ownership. And where a court enforces a plan's claim that the
controlled group rules authorize it to levy against a shareholder's
personal assets solely because the shareholder coincidentally maintained an unincorporated business, notions of fair play are violated
beyond rationalization.
V.

TBE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

The controlled group concept is clearly applicable to multiem-

ployer plans under section 4001(b). What is not clear is whether the
purpose of the rules is to prevent abuses (e.g. creating two companies, one to hold the assets and the other to sign the labor agreement in order to avoid liability), or to provide a plan with secondary
sources of recovery irrespective of any rational connection between
the existence of the liability and the secondary source. While the
former interpretation would likely pass constitutional scrutiny, the
latter is suspect.
MPPAA is not without constitutional limits. Although the Supreme Court has upheld the Act against a number of facial challenges,1 1 4 in Connolly Justice O'Connor stated:
I write separately to emphasize some of the issues the Court does not decide
today. Specifically, the Court does not decide today, and has left open in previous

113. See Washington Star Co. v. International Typo. Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d
1502, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Congress could not have imposed liability for pre-MPPAA underfunding
on employers who began contributing to a plan subsequent to the enactment of the MPPAA without
discouraging new entrants to multiemployer plans and thus defeating the MPPAA's purpose.")
114. PBGC v. R. A. Gray & Co.. 467 U.S. 717 (1984); See also Connolly, 106 S. Ct. 1018.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/4
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cases, whether the imposition of withdrawal liability under the MPPAA and of
plan termination liability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) may in some cases be so arbitrary and irrational as to violate the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. [Citations omitted]. The Court also
has no occasion to decide whether the MPPAA may violate the Taking Clause
as applied in particular cases. ....115

In this regard, Justice O'Connor noted that "[o]ur recent cases leave
open the possibility that the imposition of retroactive liability on
employers for the benefit of employees may be arbitrary and irrational in the absence of any connection between the employer's
conduct and some detriment to the employee. 11 6 Justice O'Connor
identified a number of features of multiemployer plans that form
the basis for questioning whether the imposition of retroactive liability under MPPAA may rest on suspect rationale." 7 These characteristics include: (1) prior to ERISA many multiemployer plans
specified that an employer's obligation was limited to the making
of contributions, and that both employers and employees understood
that the promise to pay pensions was conditioned on the availability
of plan assets; (2) benefit levels were established by trustees rather
than the negotiating parties; (3) promises in a collectively bargained
plan may not always be rationally traceable to the employer's conduct; (4) some employers may not begin participation in the plan
until long after the benefit structure has been determined; (5) some
employers may have had to say whatever in establishing critical features of the plan that determine the level of benefits; and (6) an
employer may be assessed withdrawal liability even though that employer's contributions exceed the present value of all benefits accrued
by its employees.
Interestingly, since these observations were made in the context
of imposing liability on a participating employer they would be magnified where a plan seeks to impose such liability not on the participating employer, but on a controlled group member with no
connection to the withdrawn employer other than common ownership. Nevertheless, some courts have gone to extremes to expand

115. Connolly, 106 S.Ct. at 1028.

116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 1029-32.
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liability to non-participating controlled group members under the
rules.' 18
The result reached in Teamsters' Pension Trust Fund v. H.F.
Johnson, 19 is particularly egregious. In H.F. Johnson, a Teamsters'
pension plan obtained a default judgment for more than $440,000
against a withdrawn corporation. 20 The plan discovered that two
individuals who each owned 49.5% of Johnson's stock also were
joint venturers in an entity known as Lockwood Leasing Company.' 2' Lockwood did not contest its controlled group status with
H.F. Johnson. However, the plan also sought a judgment against
22
the shareholders personally since Lockwood was not incorporated.
The individuals defended on the basis that applying the controlled group rules to make them personally liable would be violative
of Due Process, unless the plan could show that Lockwood derived
some benefit from its presence in the H.F. Johnson controlled
group. 23 The court disagreed, concluding that since the shareholders
had established Lockwood as an unincorporated entity, for business
reasons and their personal benefit, they would be personally liable
for H.F. Johnson's liability irrespective of any financial interdependence between Johnson and Lockwood Leasing, or any benefit
to the individuals because of the relationship between the two com4 Decisions such as H.F. Johnson demonstrate that Justice
panies. A

118. See Barker v. Williamson, 788 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1986); Progressive Supermarkets, 644 F.
Supp. 633; Connors v. Calvert Dev. Co., 622 F. Supp. 877 (D.D.C. 1985).
119. Teamsters' Pension Trust Fund v. H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d. 1009 (9th Cir. 1987).
120. H.F. Johnson, 606 F. Supp. 231, 234-35 (W.D. Wash. 1985), rev'd, 830 F.2d 1009 (9th
Cir. 1987).
121. H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 1012. The decision does not discuss the nature of the business
engaged in by Lockwood, or its connection to H.F. Johnson, if any.
122. Id. One of the shareholders was deceased, and the suit was against his estate.
123. Id. at 1013.
124. Id. at 1015. This decision appears to be seriously flawed for other reasons as well. The

court apparently concluded that the controlled group concept at § 1301(b) imposes an obligation to
contribute to the plan on all controlled group members, thereby bringing into play § 1405(c)-which

allows a withdrawn sole proprietor or partnership to limit personal liability to that which would be
protected in bankruptcy. It is beyond question that under basic labor law doctrine only a contract

signatory is liable to make contributions. Apparently the court was seeking to find a way to avoid
the perverse result that greater liability would adhere to a non-participating proprietorship than to a
participating proprietorship. The court's implausible analysis is further evidence of how a mechanical
use of the controlled group rules to allocate withdrawal liability necessarily leads to irrational results.
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O'Connor's concerns have not been heeded,' 25 and that the Supreme
Court clarification of the constitutional limits of ERISA's controlled
group rules is urgently needed.
VI.

AREAS OF CONTROVERSY

Interestingly, the controlled group rules do not compel the results
reached in some of the more draconian decisions. Even as written,
the rules are capable of an interpretation that would avoid much
of the irrationality that results when they are applied literally in the
multiemployer context. The two most important areas of flexibility
involve the definition of what constitutes "a trade or business" and
the extent of the liability to be imposed on particular group members.
A.

What is a trade or business?

Often the determination of whether an entity may be brought
into a controlled group hinges on a finding of its status as a "trade
or business." Unfortunately, assigning a clear meaning to the phrase
is greatly complicated because it is nowhere defined, 26 although it
appears in over 50 sections and 800 subsections of the Internal Revenue Code, as well as in hundreds of places in proposed and final
regulations. Furthermore, the synonymous phrases "carrying on a
trade or business" and "engaging in a trade or business" appear
in the code no less than 60 times.' 27 A review of the available literature indicates that the term is given widely differing meanings
28
depending on the context in which it is used.
The issue of what constitutes a "trade or business" in this context was brought to a head in a series of cases where individual

125. See also Spring Branch Mining Company v. UMWA Pension Plans, No. 2:86-0149 (S.D.W.
Va. Sept. 30, 1987) (rejecting company's constitutional challenge to $1.25 million assessment by UMWA
1950 Plan).
126. Groetzinger v. C.I.R., 771 F.2d. 269, 271 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985).
127. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980, 983 (1987).
128. Boyle, What is a Trade or Business?, 39 TAx L. Rv. 737 (1986); Lopez, Defining 'Trade
or Business' Under the Internal Revenue Code: A Survey of Relevant Cases, 11 FiA. ST. U.L. REv.
949 (1984); Olsen, Towards a Mutual Definition of 'Trade or Business' in the InternalRevenue Code,
54 C.
L. Ray. 1199 (1984); Levine, Goods and Services Test for Trades or Business Rejected by
Supreme Court, 66 J. TAX'N 298 (May 1987).
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shareholders were pursued for corporate pension liability because
they also maintained a rental proprietorship which leased property
129
through a net lease.
PBGC v. Center City Motors30 was the first reported decision
to address this issue in the single-employer plan context. Center City
Motors, an incorporated automobile dealership, maintained an underfunded single employer plan which was terminated in 1975. The
PBGC eventually sued both Center City Leasing, a proprietorship,
and its individual partners under the controlled group rules because
they also owned Center City Motors.' 3 ' The property in question
was leased to Center City Motors through a net lease. 3 2
The leasing partnership (and the individual partners) sought summary judgment on the grounds that a net lease is not considered to
be a trade or business under the tax code.' 33 The court refused to
grant summary judgment, holding that tax code treatment of trade
or business is not determinative for ERISA purses. 3 4 Further, the
court concluded that where the lease was between two related entities, the fact that it was a passive lease would not preclude the
leasing company from being considered a trade or business under
common control, because it was Congress' intent to prevent such
fragmentation of business operation. 135 The court specifically declined to express an opinion as to how it might rule had the net
36
lease been with an entity not under common control.
129. A net lease refers generally to an arrangement where the lessor receives a fixed rental,
performing few if any services or functions with respect to the property, and the lessee is responsible

for most if not all expenses associated with the property. Holding commercial property in this manner
through an unincorporated enterprise is not uncommon, because of favorable tax advantages.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

PBGC v. Center City Motors, 609 F. Supp. 409 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
Id. at 410-11.
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id.

135. Id. at 412. The court's characterization of the Congressional intent is too glib. It was
Congress' intent to prevent abuses that might arise as a result of business fragmentation, not to
prevent or penalize those who elect to conduct business through several distinct entities rather than
on monolithic company. This is demonstrated by the use § 410(b)(1)(B) which allows for plan qualification under the rules where the targeted abuse does not exist, even though there is business fragmentation.
136. Id. The decision merely denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on the trade or
business issue. Thus, the record does not reveal the extent of the relationship, whether it was in fact
designed to avoid liabilities, or whether the court would have imposed a limit on the partners' personal
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/4
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The issue was revisited in United Food & Commercial Workers
Union v. Progressive Supermarkets,3 7 a case involving more than
$750,000 in withdrawal liability assessed by two multiemployer pension plans. 38 Progressive Supermarkets' shareholders also maintained B.E.G.M. Associates, a general partnership which owned a
parcel of land upon which one of Progressive's stores was located.3 9
B.E.G.M. leased the property to the corporation through a net
lease. 140 B.E.G.M. and its individual partners defended on the basis
that the partnership was a passive investment trust and, therefore,
was not a trade or business.1 41 The court reviewed the status of the
case law interpreting a trade or business in the net lease context and
concluded that interpretations under Code sections other than § 414(c)
were not controlling. 42 The court, without discussing whether any
of the abuses intended to be addressed by the rules were present in
the case, simply held that treating the companies as a single employer
would insure that the realities of business organization would prevail
over the formalities of corporate structure. 143 However, this court
also declined to speculate on whether the result might be different
had the net lease been with a third party. 144
In Connors v. B&M Coal Company, 45 the UMWA Plans sued
Tazewell Leasing and its proprietor for withdrawal liability which
had been assessed against a corporation which was also owned by
the individual. Tazewell Leasing owned a parcel of real estate which
it leased out, but it had no employees and was not engaged in the
offering of goods and services. 46 The court reviewed existing case
law and authority with respect to the what constitutes a trade or

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Progressive Supermarkets, 644 F. Supp. 633.
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 639.

144. Id.
145. Connors v. B&M Coal Co., No. 84-514 (D.D.C. May 28, 1986).
146. Opinion of May 28, 1986 at p. 16. This opinion was subsequently withdrawn and reissued
to reflect that the parties had previously stipulated to the dismissal of Tazewell Leasing as a defendant.
In view of this it has precedential value only insofar as the reasoning employed by the court is
compelling in its own right.
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business under the Internal Revenue Code. In view of § 1301(b)'s
express reference to § 414(c), the court felt that "the presumption
that construals under the IRC of what does and does not constitute
a trade or business should be controlling."'' 47 The court concluded
that the lease arrangement maintained by Tazewell Leasing did not
148
rise to the level of a trade or business.
To determine whether the activities of a taxpayer rise to the level
of carrying on a business requires the examination of the facts in
each case. 49 In the absence of a uniform and functional definition
of trade or business, and in light of the PBGC's failure to develop
regulations interpreting the phrase in the MPPAA withdrawal liability context, the courts should look to Code and tax authority for
guidance. Moreover, the court should consider a variety of factors,
such as the offering of goods and services, continuity, repetition and
extensiveness of the activity, and the profit-making motive. For example, a sporadic activity, a hobby, or an amusement diversion
clearly should not qualify as trade or business. 10 Existing authority
supports the basic concept that a "trade or business" must be an
actively conducted enterprise having at least some of the usual characteristics of a typical business, such as employees, and the provision
151
or sale of'goods and/or services.
In numerous tax cases and rulings, the courts and the Internal
Revenue Service construed the term "trade or business" under different code sections, drawing a distinction between passive enterprises and true trades or business. The courts have adhered to the

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 17.
Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).
Id. at 217.
This principle has enabled the Internal Revenue Service to successfully defeat attempts by

taxpayers to take advantage of favorable business-oriented tax provisions when in fact their purported
businesses were merely investments. Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code permits deductions for
actively conducted businesses only. Regulations under section 761 of the Code (Treas. Reg. § 1.7611(a) (1987)) provide that a mere co-ownership of property and sharing expenses and collecting rents,

does not constitute a "partnership" entitled to special tax treatment under subehapter K of the Internal
Revenue Code, unless the co-owners actively carry on a business. Section 1231 of the Code provides

favorable tax treatment for the sale of property used in a trade or business, but not for investment
properties. Section 6166 of the Code permits an estate to amortize federal estate tax liabilities over
held business.

several years to the extent attributable to interests in a closely
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general principle that truly passive investment enterprises, no matter
how extensive, are not a trade or business.1 2 In Commissioner v.
Groetzinger,153 for example, Justice Blackmun recognized that most
trades or businesses must have some active component. Further, the

Supreme Court held more than 40 years ago that the mere ownership
of property and the collection of interests, dividends or rents does

not constitute "carrying on a trade or business."' 54 It is equally clear
that the mere holding of stocks, bonds, real estate or other investment property does not constitute a trade or business under the Code
for any purpose. Moreover, Internal Revenue Service rulings under
Section 6166 of the Code clearly illustrate the principle that the mere
passive ownership of property does not constitute a "trade or busi55
ness."1
Such enterprises have no direct relevance to ferreting out the
abuses intended to be prevented under the controlled group rules

of ERISA. These endeavors normally do not involve setting up employee benefit plans which could, through fragmentation of a business, allow the establishment of plans benefiting exclusively owners,
officers or the highly compensated, to the exclusion of others. Similarly, it is highly unlikely that they are established in the first instance to avoid imposition of MPPAA liability. Although it would
be inappropriate to rely exclusively on such restrictive tax code authority to determine which entities will be treated as § 1301(b) trades
or businesses for MPPAA liability purposes, the extensive broad-

152. See, e.g., Ninberg v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 512, 515 (1967); Higgins, 312 U.S.
212 (taxpayer denied deductions for expenses incurred in connection with investment in real estate,
stocks and bonds, involving interpretation of predecessor to Code section 162 which allows deductions
for expenses in connection with "carrying on a trade or business").
153. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987). This case involved a claim that a full
time gambler who made wages solely for his account was engaged in a "trade or business" for purposes
of Code sections 162(a) and 62(1). The court concluded that basic concepts of fairness demanded
that the gambler's activity be regarded as a trade or business since it involved all the indicia normally
associated with that concept.
154. Higgins, 312 U.S. 212. See also Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
155. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-52-086 (Sept. 30, 1983) (stock in two corporate holding companies formed essentially for the rental of real estate on a passive basis did not constitute stock in
a business under Section 6166). See also Rev. Rul. 75-365, 1975-2 C.B. 471; cf. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8350-008 (Aug. 23, 1983) (under Code section 1231, a taxpayer was denied ordinary loss treatment for
the sale of rental property purportedly used in a trade or business).
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based authority which separates passive commercial endeavors from
active businesses is highly relevant. Many tax advantages available
to business owners are not available to investors or even those with
a hobby which on occasion makes a profit."1 6 In fairness, individuals
involved in such activities should not be saddled with the penal elements of the controlled group rules without demonstration of the
targeted abuse simply based on definition of the phrase "trade or
business."
Thus, while a court arguably has wide latitude in determining what
constitutes a trade or business for purposes of determining the scope
of liability for MPPAA obligations, it should construe the term narrowly when faced with commercial endeavors not traditionally entitled
to the advantages afforded to true "trades or businesses." Unfortunately, most of the decisions to date reflect a tendency to simply
disregard such substantial authority under the tax code and resort
instead to pronouncements that broad construction of the term will
provide maximum protection to workers covered by pension plans.
Even if such uncritical generalizations are arguably appropriate in
the single-employer plan arena, they are of no relevance in the MPPAA
collection context. Thoughtful treatment of the targeted abuses which
concerned Congress in seeking to prevent the fragmentation of a trade
or business offers the best opportunity to craft a MPPAA liability
policy that harmonizes the controlled group concept with the goal of
encouraging employer receptivity to participation in multiemployers
plans.
In this regard, certain enterprises clearly should not constitute a
trade or business for MPPAA liability purposes. A proprietorship
involved in a net lease should not be characterized as a trade or
business, unless it can fairly be said that it was an integrated part
of the "business" of the withdrawn employer, or unless there is affirmative evidence that the arrangement was designed to avoid MPPAA
liability. Moreover, all activities which lack clear indicia of trade or
business status, such as leasing arrangements which have no employees and which do not conduct business with the general public,
156. 26 U.S.C. § 183 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/4
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hobbies, tax shelters and investment devices, should be excluded from
the term "trade or business", unless the plan can demonstrate a direct
connection the withdrawn employer.
B. The extent of personal liability for corporate withdrawal
obligations.
It is clear that Congress did not intend that MPPAA be interpreted
to authorize a per se piercing of the corporate veil. Absent a controlled group situation, the personal exposure of shareholders for their
withdrawn corporation's MPPAA liability will be adjudicated in accordance with traditional exceptions to the basic doctrine of limited
liability for corporate obligations. Thus a shareholder's personal assets, even if accumulated as the result of years of successful operations
by the withdrawn corporation, are not subject to collection by the
plan.
This was made clear in Connors v. P&M Coal Co. 15 7 In P&M,
the trial court awarded the UMWA Plans judgment against the two
50% shareholders of the corporation because they had significant
ownership and control over the operation of the corporation and were
personally involved in matters pertaining to the Plans and to the
decision to withdraw. 5 On appeal, the court rejected the Plans' argument that an economic reality test was consistent with the purpose
of MPPAA, concluding that
the principle of limited liability is so fundamental to our corporate law that we

require more than an expansive interpretation of a definition in Title I to persuade
us that Congress intended the word 'employer' in Title IV to encompass ownerofficers acting within the legitimate scope of their corporate responsibilities. 5 9

Significantly, the court considered the interplay between the imposition of personal liability and the Congressional intent with respect
to MPPAA, concluding that, "given MPPAA's stated policy to alleviate conditions 'which tend to discourage the maintenance and
growth of multiemployer pension plans' [citations omitted], we find

157. Connors v. P&M Coal Co., 801 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
158. Id. at 1375.
159. Id. at 1377.
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it doubtful that Congress would have required controlling shareholders to surrender the limited liability protection afforded by corporate law as a condition for allowing their companies to participate
in such plans."'' 6
The First Circuit reached the same conclusion in DeBreceni v.
Graf Brothers Leasing,'61 a case very similar to P&M on its facts.
The court observed that "the principle of limited liability is a cornerstone of corporate law"' 62 and "longstanding enough and important enough to be considered a background norm, against which
Congress may act of course, but which is controlling in the absence
of such action." 163 As in P&M the court considered the legislative
history and purposes of MPPAA, and concluded that the Act
represents a balance between efforts to protect existing pension plan beneficiaries
through a short term strategy of imposing burdens on current employer contributors
and through a long term strategy of encouraging new employers to contribute to
multiemployer pension funds [citations omitted]. Imposing personal liability for
withdrawal payments would hurt that long term strategy by discouraging controlling
individuals from directing their corporations to participate in multiemployer pension
funds.""'

Applying the controlled group rules in a manner that makes shareholders personally liable because they maintained a separate trade or
business as a proprietorship or partnership conveys to a plan, indirectly, a source of liability recovery which Congress proscribed directly. Yet, nothing in the statute or the legislative history compels
this inconsistent result. Furthermore, this exceptionally harsh result
finds support nowhere except in judicial decisions. It is ironic that
some courts have discarded with relative ease the significant doctrine
of limited liability for corporate obligations to give effect to the purported Congressional intent that controlled group liability should be
expansive, while applying the corollary to this doctrine-unlimited
personal liability where the corporate form does not exist-ruthlessly,
without consideration as to whether the imposition of personal lia160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1378.
DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, 828 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1987).
Id. at 879.
Id. at 880.
Id.
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bility is likewise consonant with legislative intent and statutory goals.
By parity of reasoning if "one of the evident purposes of Congress
in enacting § 1301(b)(1) was to ensure that 'the realities of business
organization' would prevail over 'the formalities of corporate structure' in imposing liability under ERISA," 165 then such realities are
equally relevant in ascertaining whether unlimited personal liability
is appropriate. That is, if the doctrine of limited liability for corporate
obligations is not sacrosanct under the controlled group concept, then
the doctrine of unlimited personal liability for the obligations of an
unincorporated entity should likewise not be sacrosanct.
Decisions such as H.F. Johnson, Progressive Supermarkets and
Calvert Dev. Co. permit plans to accomplish indirectly what they
cannot accomplish directly-pursue individual shareholders personally
for corporate withdrawal liability. Not only do the controlled group
rules not mandate this result, but applying the rules in this manner
also leads to such routinely arbitrary and irrational results that the
boundary of constitutional protection are clearly breached.
The fact that application of the rules cannot pass a rational basis
analysis can be demonstrated by a simple example. Two cousins, Larry
Litigator and Peter Partner each inherited $400,000 from a relative.
Larry, a struggling attorney practicing on his own, invested $300,000
of his inheritance to purchase Bad Luck Coal Company, putting the
remaining $100,000 into a money market account. He lives frugally
because he earns only $30,000 a year from his law practice, and Bad
Luck has never shown a profit. Peter Partner invested $300,000 of
his inheritance to purchase Good Luck Coal Company, also placing
the remaining $100,000 in a money market account. Peter earns
$200,000 a year in a large law firm where he is a partner, and he
has also received $400,000 in salary and dividends from Good Luck.
As a result of adverse business conditions in the industry, both companies have ceased operations, and each has been assessed $300,000
in MPPAA liability.
A mechanical application of the controlled group rules will enable
the plan to obtain a personal judgment against Larry Litigator for
165. Progressive Supermarkets, 644 F. Supp. at 639 (quoting Anthony Co., 537 F. Supp. at
1052 n.6).
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$300,000 because Bad Luck and Litigator's law proprietorship are
trades or businesses under common control. The plan will levy against
Litigator's $100,000 money market account, and he will be able to
protect his assets and income only to the extent they are exempt under
applicable bankruptcy law. Peter Partner on the other hand will have
no personal liability to the plan because, under the controlled group
rules, his multiple partner law practice is not in Good Luck's controlled group.
As this example illustrates, literal application of the rules cannot
lead to a defensible allocation of liability unless they are premised
on some rational connection between the withdrawn employer and
the entity to be held secondarily liable. Although the Act does not
authorize a per se piercing of the corporate veil to hold shareholders
personally liable for corporate withdrawal liability, the controlled group
rules are being used to accomplish this end against certain groups in
a highly discriminatory manner. In effect, they operate to make one
category of shareholders liable (owners of unincorporated businesses),
in a manner that deprives this group of equal protection under law.
Furthermore, even assuming a connection between the entities can
be demonstrated, 16 the unincorporated enterprise should, for collection purposes, be treated as though it were incorporated, thereby
limiting the plan's recovery to the net assets of the trade or business
absent circumstances justifying application of traditional veil-piercing
doctrines. This limitation is completely consistent with the often-cited
purpose of the controlled group rules "to prevent a business from
limiting its responsibilities under ERISA by the fractionalization of
its business operations."' 6 7 Applying the rules in this manner addresses the realities of business organization by, in effect, ignoring
the separate existence of the unincorporated entity and placing it back
into the "business" of the withdrawn corporation. On the other hand,
to seize on the existence of an unincorporated entity in the controlled

166. In Progressive Supermarkets, for example, the facts might, when fully developed, demonstrate that the property in question was placed in B.E.G.M. Associates after the effective date of
MPPAA, and for the purpose of minimizing assets should the corporation become unable to pay its
obligations.
167. Progressive Supermarkets, 644 F. Supp. at 639 (quoting Center City Motors, 609 F. Supp.
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group as a basis for imposing unlimited personal liability on the corporate shareholders emphasizes the formalities of corporate structure
168
in a punitive, even vindictive fashion.
VII.

TowARDS A RATIONAL THEORY OF CONTROLLED GRouP

LIABILITY FOR MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS
Congress intended that the federal courts develop a federal common law to fill in the interstices of ERISA. 169 The courts have relied
upon this directive frequently to implement the Act in a manner consistent with its purposes. 170 In view of the lack of legislative history
concerning the role of the controlled group concept in assigning iIability for corporate withdrawal obligations, and the absence of regulations implementing the concept in a manner consistent with the
realities of both multiemployer plans and business structures, it is
certainly appropriate that the courts develop a thoughtful, consistent
application of the concept in specific cases. Indeed, in view of the
significance of the rules to those affected, and the arbitrary applications to date, development of federal common law in the multiemployer plan area is critical. It is suggested that the outlines for a
common law doctrine of MPPAA controlled group liability should
include the following general principles.
First, contrary to the analysis in Center City Motors and Progressive Supermarkets, the concept of what constitutes a trade or
business should be viewed narrowly, not expansively. Substantial deference should be given to the tax code treatment of "trade or business." Thus, net leases, commercial activities which are little more
than investment devices or legitimate passive tax shelters, part-time
activities, and "businesses" which are in reality hobbies, should not

168. The court imposed personal liability on the individual shareholder(s) for corporate withdrawal obligations in the amount of $440,000 in H.F. Johnson, 830 F.2d 1009, more than $750,000
in Progressive Supermarkets, 644 F. Supp. 633, and almost $200,000 in Calvert Dev. Co., 622 F.
Supp. 877, without any consideration of the actual value of the unincorporated entity, or the existence
of the targeted abuse.
169. See 120 CoNo. REc. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) (Congress "intended that a
body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights
and obligations under private welfare and pension plans").
170. See, e.g., Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1980); Van Orman v.
American Ins. Co. 680 F.2d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 1982).
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be swept into the definition of a trade or business. In the situation
where the unincorporated entity is involved in the business of the
withdrawn employer, liability can be assigned under other doctrines.17 1
Secondly, a facts and circumstances test should be applied when
considering the expansion of liability for any corporation withdrawing
from a multiemployer plan. Where the plan cannot demonstrate any
connection between its unfunded liability and the withdrawing employer, the rules should not be applied to make a non-participating
controlled group member liable. 72 Example: The sole shareholder of
Bad Luck Coal Company also owns Fun Times, Inc., a tour guide
company in Hawaii which has never had any relationship whatsoever
to the coal company. Bad Luck can demonstrate that none of the
plan's unfunded liability is attributable to benefits accrued by Bad
Luck's employees. Although these two entities fall within the controlled group definition, liability should not be expanded to Fun Times,
Inc. absent clear evidence that their corporate forms were utilized to
avoid payment of the assessment.
Third, where the economic connection between the withdrawn employer and the non-participating controlled group member is sufficient
to justify the imposition of liability, the amount of the liability should
bear some rational relationship to the advantages gained. Where the
two companies do business almost exclusively with one another, this
test would result in holding the non-participating employer liable for
up to the full amount of its net assets. Where the connection is at
best indirect (such as filing a consolidated tax return), the liability
of the non-participating employer should be limited to an amount
171. A restrictive reading of "trade or business" does not deprive a plan of the ability to pursue
personal liability under traditional exceptions to limited corporate liability such as alter ego and piercing the corporate veil. See P&M Coal Co., 801 F.2d at 1378; Graf Bros. Leasing, 828 F.2d at 879.
Furthermore, section 4212(c) of ERISA, provides that: "If a principal purpose of any transaction is
to evade or avoid liability under this part, this part shall be applied (and liability shall be determined
and collected) without regard to such transaction." 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c). This provision serves as an
additional source of authority for preventing corporate manipulation, independent of the controlled
group concept.
172. Even the Tax Court, in the context of applying the rules in the plan discrimination context,
cautioned against incautious application of the rules: "Respondent's harsh position does nothing to
advance the purpose Congress had in mind in enacting section 414(c), but does plenty to subvert the
overriding purpose of Congress to encourage the establishment of pension plans for employees."
Sutherland, 78 T.C. at 407.
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reasonably related to the advantages conferred by virtue of the controlled group relationship, similar to the approach used by the court
in Anthony Co.
Fourth, under no circumstances should an individual be held personally liable for the corporate obligation solely because of the existence of an unincorporated trade or business in the controlled group.
Rather, the extent of liability should be limited to the net worth of
the unincorporated trade or business. Any liability beyond this should
be based not on the controlled group rules, but on the same considerations that always apply when considering whether individual
shareholders should be personally liable for corporate obligations.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In cases to date, courts have demonstrated a willingness to apply
the controlled group rules literally and broadly, without an in-depth
analysis of their relevance in the multiemployer plan context. Moreover, liability has been imposed without regard to whether the members of the group have any economic or commercial relationship, or
whether application of the rules is, in fact, redressing abusive or manipulative behavior. Furthermore, joint and several liability is being
imposed on shareholders solely because an unincorporated business
is in the group.
This mechanical use of the controlled group concept is not consistent with the purpose of MPPAA or the Congressional intent underlying the rules themselves. Indeed, literal application of the rules
raises serious constitutional issues because the results are routinely
irrational, have no connection whatsoever to the existence of the liability in question, and discriminate impermissible against the owners
of small, unincorporated trades or businesses and individuals who
engage in investment-type activities or tax sheltered arrangements.
Such results are not compelled by the statute and could be avoided
by interpreting and applying the rules in an analytical and thoughtful
manner reflective of their true purpose.
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